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INTRODUCTION
During the past fifty years mandatory disclosure has emerged as a
dominant method of legal regulation in the United States.1  Disclosure
regulation, especially through forms of “targeted transparency,”2 is par-
* Associate Professor of Law, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College (CUNY).
J.D., NYU School of Law, 1993.
1. See ARCHON FUNG, ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANS-
PARENCY 20–24 (2007); MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE OF TECHNO-
POPULISM 4 (2002) (discussing emergence of “government by disclosure. . . as a third wave
of modern risk regulation”); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational
Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 619 (1999) (“Mandatory disclosure was
a central part of the rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, and it has become especially
prominent in the 1980s and 1990s, largely as an alternative to command-and-control
regulation.”).
2. Fung, Graham, and Weil refer to the “required disclosure of specific factual
information, usually by corporations or other private organizations” as “targeted trans-
parency.”  Fung, et al., supra note 1, at xiii; id. at 5 (“Instead of aiming to generally R
improve public deliberation and officials’ accountability, targeted transparency aims to
reduce specific risks or performance problems through selective disclosure by corpora-
tions and other organizations.”); see also Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Dis-
closure and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574, 577–83 (2012) (discussing the rise of
targeted transparency regulations).  Rather than using the term “targeted transparency,”
this Article uses the general terms mandatory or mandated disclosure, which are more
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ticularly prevalent in the realm of consumer law,3 but there are exam-
ples in virtually every area of law4 “across regulatory areas as diverse as
securities regulation, campaign finance, product safety, energy regula-
tion, employment law, environmental law, and health law,”5 just to
name a few.6  Carl Schneider and Lee Teitelbaum capture what might
be seen by some as pathology in our political system:7
Are companies selling worthless stocks?  Securities laws say, “Dis-
close!” Are creditors lending money usuriously?  Consumer pro-
tection laws say, “Disclose!”  Are manufacturers selling hazardous
merchandise?  Products-liability law says, “Disclose!”  Are police
bullying criminal suspects into waiving their rights? Miranda says,
“Disclose!” Are spouses soliciting shady antenuptial contracts?
Family law says, “Disclose!” Behold, then, disclosure, the sovereign
remedy for all your ills.8
The turn to mandatory disclosure can be seen as the product of a
political struggle (or compromise9) between those with libertarian lean-
ings who favor laissez faire approaches to market regulation10 and
progressives who desire stronger, more direct forms of government
3. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 659 (2011) (observing that “[f]inancial disclosures stretch to every
domain of consumer protection”).  The classic example is Truth in Lending disclosures
in connection with the extension of consumer credit. See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601–1667e (2006).
4. See Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (2007) (“There are dozens, possibly hundreds, of regulatory
schemes that use disclosure in whole or in part to accomplish their purposes.”); FUNG, ET
AL., supra note 1, at 21–23, tbl. 2.1 (summarizing targeted transparency laws from 1996 to R
2005).
5. Ho, supra note 2, at 577 (“Mandated disclosure to solve informational failures— R
and to empower parties to make informed decisions—has long been recognized as a the-
oretical matter.  Examples of mandated disclosure abound across regulatory areas as
diverse as securities regulation, campaign finance, product safety, energy regulation,
employment law, environmental law, and health law.”) (footnotes omitted).
6. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 650 (stating that “[m]andated dis- R
closure is ubiquitous” and providing an extensive list of mandatory disclosure laws).
7. See Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure:
Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 200
(2005) (noting that the “preference for regulating through disclosure might be seen as
either desirable public policy or evidence of pathology in the U.S. political system”);
Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons From the Truth-In-Lending Act, 80
GEO. L.J. 233, 234–35 (1991) (“Our penchant for disclosure laws is . . . in part a collective
neurosis.”).
8. Carl E. Schneider & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Life’s Golden Tree: Empirical Scholarship
and American Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 53, 98 (2006).
9. See Rubin, supra note 7, at 234–35 (referring to penchant for disclosure laws as
“in part a political compromise”).
10. See Dalley, supra note 4, at 1093 (“[D]isclosure-based regulation appeals to those
with a promarket political orientation because it addresses market failure without dis-
turbing other beneficial features of the market.”); see also Steven W. Bender, Consumer
Protection for Latinos: Overcoming Language Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM.
U. L. REV. 1027, 1073 (1996) (noting the “usual tendency of legislatures and of many
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intervention in the marketplace.11  William Sage explains the point
well: “Because disclosure laws influence private transactions without
substituting direct government regulation, they illuminate all parts of
the political spectrum, appealing equally to conservatives, who applaud
‘market facilitation’ and ‘bootstrapping,’ and to liberals, who favor
‘empowerment’ and the ‘right to know.’”12  Another way to express this
point is to state that the typical mandatory disclosure law is “expressively
overdetermined” in that “it bears meanings sufficiently rich in nature
and large in number to enable diverse cultural groups to find simulta-
neously affirmation of their values within it.”13
Although mandatory disclosure laws purportedly offer something
to both libertarians and progressives, such regulation also generates
criticism from across the political spectrum.  Critics decry the adminis-
trative burdens and costs created by mandatory disclosure laws14 while
opponents on the left would consider substantively regulating the terms
of consumer contracts to protect the economically disadvantaged and
disenfranchised.15  Both sides in such debates typically share one thing
in common—a commitment to evaluating mandatory disclosure regula-
tion instrumentally, based upon whether such disclosures achieve cer-
tain recognized public policy objectives.  In many cases, this means that
mandatory disclosure laws are evaluated by the extent to which such
regulations facilitate market efficiency.  The debate over disclosure thus
tends to become empirical,16 as advocates fight over the efficacy of par-
11. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 681 (observing that mandated R
disclosure is alluring because it serves both free-market and autonomy principles); Grif-
fith L. Garwood, et al., Consumer Disclosure in the 1990’s, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 777, 780
(1993) (“[D]isclosure serves as an attractive alternative to the substantive regulation of
agreements and conduct as a method of achieving a balanced relationship between the
service provider and the consumer.”); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy
and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 261 (2002) (“Disclosure rules have an abiding
appeal to lawmakers, judges, and scholars who are troubled by the adhesion contract
problem, but are still wedded to a free market solution.”).
12. William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American
Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1825–26 (1999).
13. Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions?, 84 TEX. L. REV.
2075, 2085 (2006) (citing Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns,
the Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55
EMORY L.J. 569, 587 (2006)).
14. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 651: R
Although mandated disclosure addresses a real problem and rests on a plausible
assumption, it chronically fails to accomplish its purpose.  Even where it seems
to succeed, its costs in money, effort, and time generally swamp its benefits.  And
mandated disclosure has unintended and undesirable consequences, like driv-
ing out better regulation and hurting the people it purports to help.
See also id. at 735  (“Whatever benefits mandated disclosures may offer, mandates are
unjustifiable if their costs outweigh their benefits.”).
15. Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Preda-
tory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 831 (2006) (“Policymakers preferring a free market
approach generally favor disclosure, and those favoring a paternalist approach generally
favor substantive controls on terms.”).
16. The extent to which the empirical assertions on which policy recommendations
are actually tested and established by the accepted methods of social science is another
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ticular disclosures and whether the benefits of disclosure outweigh the
costs in various regulatory contexts.17  In short, the debates generally
assume a consequentialist theory of mandatory disclosure.
In contrast to the dominant consequentialist perspective on
mandatory disclosure, this Article will contend that mandatory disclo-
sure laws, especially in the context of consumer credit regulation, can
profitably be viewed through the lens of virtue ethics, a philosophical
rival to the dominant consequentialist and deontological ethical tradi-
tions in modern moral theory.  The incorporation of virtue ethics into
legal theory is part of a vibrant, growing movement called “virtue juris-
prudence,” which is devoted to shifting our focus within legal theory
away from moral and ethical concepts such as duties, rights, welfare,
and consequences, and towards examining the character traits or vir-
tues necessary for people to achieve authentic human flourishing.
To better understand these related scholarly movements, Part I of
this Article briefly surveys the rise of virtue ethics in modern moral and
ethical theory as well as the emergence of the “virtue jurisprudence”
movement in legal theory.  Part II explores how virtue theory can
enrich our understanding of mandatory disclosure laws.  To make the
discussion a bit more concrete, this Article uses the regulation of con-
sumer credit as an example of this aretaic approach to mandatory dis-
closure.  In particular, this Article addresses whether mandatory
disclosure laws could be used to create the conditions necessary for con-
sumers to achieve “eudaimonia,” or authentic human flourishing, by
fostering virtues such as temperance and prudence.  Part III then dis-
cusses the major objection to the use of law to inculcate virtue—the
value pluralism objection.  Basically, this boils down to the notion that
the legislative promotion of virtue is incompatible with liberal commit-
ments to individual autonomy—the right that we have to choose for
ourselves what a good life entails.  The Article concludes by arguing
that value pluralism need not doom aretaic theories of mandatory dis-
closure, at least not in the case of mandatory disclosures that are specifi-
cally aimed at the promotion of virtues related to enlightened
consumption, such as temperance and prudence, as opposed to more
controversial virtues related to sexual and religious orthodoxy.
I. THE RISE OF “VIRTUE” IN MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY—A
BRIEF SURVEY
A. The Rise of Modern Virtue Ethics
Modern moral theory often is viewed as a contest between two
dominant approaches to normative ethics:18 consequentialism,19 which
17. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (2008); Ronald J. Mann, Unsafe at Any Price?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 167
(2009).
18. See Eric R. Claeys, Response, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 COR-
NELL L. REV. 889, 894–97 (2009) (providing an excellent account of the deontology/
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is closely linked to welfare economics in modern economic theory,20
and deontology, which is often taken to mean some form of Kantian-
ism21 (though that need not be the case).  In the middle of the twenti-
eth century, however, discontent with both consequentialist and
deontological moral theorizing was manifested in the publication of a
path-breaking article by Elizabeth Anscombe, entitled Modern Moral Phi-
losophy,22 which proposed “to look for moral norms not in duty con-
cepts but within the virtues or traits of character that one needs to
flourish as a human being.”23  Anscombe is widely credited with launch-
ing a modern renaissance in aretaic24 or virtue theory.25  This revival of
interest in virtue in modern moral theory has proceeded along several
different paths.  Some philosophers have sought to enrich existing
deontological and consequentialist moral theories by incorporating the
moral importance of good character and virtue into those theories.26
Other philosophers, however, have a much more ambitious agenda.
These theorists have called for a true philosophical alternative to conse-
quentialism and deontology—a “genuinely free-standing ethics of vir-
tue”27 under the banner of “virtue ethics.”28
19. Berys Gaut, Consequentialism, in CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 176
(Robert Audi, ed. 2d ed. 1999) (defining consequentialism as “the doctrine that the
moral rightness of an act is determined solely by the goodness of the act’s conse-
quences”); see also Henry R. West, Consequentialism, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 460
(Donald Borchert, ed. 2d ed. 2006) (“As a name for any ethical theory or for the class of
ethical theories that evaluate actions by the value of the consequences of the actions,
‘consequentialism’ thus refers to classical utilitarianism and other theories that share this
characteristic”); see also Samantha Brennan, Moral Lumps, 9 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL
PRAC. 249, 250 (2006) (“Life is simple for the consequentialist.  According to consequen-
tialist moral theories, the right act is the act that brings about the most good overall.”).
20. See EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS AND MORALITY 12 (2010)
(explaining that welfare economics is “a consequentialist theory, as it evaluates the desira-
bility of acts, rules, policies, projects, etc., solely according to their outcomes”); see also
Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral Constraints with
Economic Analysis of Law, 96 CAL. L. REV. 323, 329–30 (2008) (summarizing principles of
welfare economics).
21. See Nancy (Ann) Davis, Contemporary Deontology, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 205,
205 (Peter Singer ed., 1991) (noting a link between Immanuel Kant and modern deonto-
logical moral theories).
22. G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy 33 PHIL. 1 (1958).
23. Robert B. Louden, Virtue Ethics, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 687 (Donald
Borchert ed., 2d ed. 2006).
24. See CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 43 (Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999)
(defining arête as “the ancient Greek term meaning ‘virtue’ or ‘excellence’”).
25. See Ronald J. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 9
(2012) (tracing rise of virtue ethics to Anscombe); Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in 6
NEW DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 2421, 2421 (2004) (same); Louden, supra note
23, at 687 (same).
26. See ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 3 (1999) (noting that “some
deontologists and utilitarians have reacted to virtue ethics by seeking to address it within
their own theories”); Lawrence J. Jost, Virtue and Vice, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
678 (Donald Borchert ed., 2d ed. 2006) (citing consequentialists and Kantians that have
incorporated virtue into their works).
27. Michael Slote, Virtue Ethics, in MARCIA W. BARON, PHILIP PETTIT & MICHAEL
SLOTE, THREE METHODS OF ETHICS: A DEBATE 176 (1997).
28. A lucid overview of virtue ethics can be found in STAN VAN HOOFT, UNDERSTAND-
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The “bewildering variety of claims made by philosophers in the
name of virtue ethics”29 makes trying to sum up the core teachings of
virtue ethics (or virtue theory, generally) a perilous business.30  Never-
theless, as Heidi Li Feldman states with clarity:  “What unites philoso-
phers in the virtue ethics tradition . . . is their concern with the quality
of human life and an effort to identify both what counts as a life of high
quality or worth and the character traits it takes to achieve one.”31  In
the interest of simplicity, I will focus here on the most influential strand
of virtue ethics in legal theory, neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics,32 which, as
one can tell by its name, is heavily indebted to Aristotle,33 and his clas-
sic work, Nicomachean Ethics.34  Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics differs
from deontology and consequentialism in that it “derives its justifica-
tion from virtue as an end in and of itself: virtue promotes human
excellence, and human excellence is an end of itself, not tethered
either to the concepts of duty or welfare.”35
But what, exactly, does such a theory entail?  At the risk of gross
oversimplification, we can note three core principles of contemporary,
neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics.  First, virtue ethics teaches us that “an
action is right if and only if it is what an agent with a virtuous character
would do in the circumstances.”36  Second, virtuous agents have certain
AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981); PHILIPPA FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS
(2001); PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
(1978); ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999); MICHAEL SLOTE, MORALS FROM
MOTIVES (2001); CHRISTINE SWANTON, VIRTUE ETHICS: A PLURALISTIC VIEW (2003).  Collec-
tions include VIRTUE ETHICS: OXFORD READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY (Roger Crisp & Michael
Slote eds., 1997); VIRTUE ETHICS: A CRITICAL READER (Daniel Statman ed., 1997); HOW
SHOULD ONE LIVE?: ESSAYS ON THE VIRTUES (Roger Crisp ed., 1996).
29. Justin Oakley, Varieties of Virtue Ethics, 9 RATIO 128, 128 (1996).
30. Kyron Huigens, On Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 465, 479 (2004) [hereinafter Huigens, Aristotelian Criminal Law]
(“[A]retaic ethics is hardly a monolithic school of thought.  On the contrary, it exhibits
the variety and dissension of any young and healthy intellectual enterprise.”).
31. Heidi L. Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort
Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431, 1436 (2000).
32. Peter Simpson, Contemporary Virtue Ethics and Aristotle, in VIRTUE ETHICS: A CRITI-
CAL READER, supra note 28, at 245 (“They are Aristotelians because they accept Aristotle’s
fundamental ideas; they are neo-Aristotelians because they reject some of his conclusions,
notably about manual labor, slavery and women.”).
33. See Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 70 (2006); Karen
Stohr, Contemporary Virtue Ethics, 1 PHIL. COMPASS 22, 23 (2006).  Aristotle in turn, was
undoubtedly indebted to his teacher, Plato, and scholars even have noted that focus on
virtue can be seen in earlier Eastern philosophy, as well as “later Greek and Christian
writers [such as Sir Thomas Aquinas] who continued to emphasize the central impor-
tance of the virtues in human life.”  Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in 6 NEW DICTION-
ARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 2421, 2421 (2004).
34. For a new translation with commentary, see ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
(Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins eds. & trans., 2011).
35. Chapin F. Cimino, Private Law, Public Consequences, and Virtue Jurisprudence, 71 U.
PITT. L. REV. 279, 285 n.13 (2009).
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character traits known as virtues37—“the core characteristics valued by
moral philosophers and religious thinkers: wisdom, courage, humanity,
justice, temperance and transcendence.”38 Third, for many virtue
ethicists, there is a vital relationship between the virtues and
“eudaimonia,”39 which “is a transliteration of the Greek word for pros-
perity, good fortune, wealth, or happiness.”40
Before moving on to the rise of virtue in legal theory, two of the
terms above, virtue and eudaimonia, require a bit of unpacking since
they are essential for understanding neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics.  We
can turn to the concept of virtue first.  Christine Swanton states: “A vir-
tue is a good quality or excellence of character.  It is a disposition of
acknowledging or responding to items in the field of a virtue in an
excellent (or good enough) way.”41  Virtue ethicists often view moral
virtues42 as an ideal balance or mean between possessing too much or
too little of a trait in a particular field of human endeavor.43  A com-
monly used example is courage:
Aristotle argued that the moral virtues can be conceptualized as
the mean between two opposing character deficiencies with
respect to a morally neutral emotion.  Courage, for example, is a
mean between the opposing vices of cowardice and rashness; the
morally neutral emotion is fear.  Cowards are disposed to fear too
37. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 26, at 29 (“A virtuous agent is one who has, and R
exercises, certain character traits, namely, the virtues.”); Rosalind Hursthouse, Normative
Virtue Ethics, in VIRTUE ETHICS: OXFORD READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 28, at 22–23.
38. CHRISTOPHER PETERSON & MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN, CHARACTER STRENGTHS AND
VIRTUES: A HANDBOOK AND CLASSIFICATION 13 (2004).
39. Not all versions of virtue ethics are eudaimonistic. See Christopher Cordner,
Three Contemporary Perspectives on Moral Philosophy, 30 PHIL. INVESTIGATIONS 65, 80 (2007)
(commenting on Christine Swanton’s rejection of eudaimonism); Ekow N. Yankah, Vir-
tue’s Domain, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1167, 1173 n.11 (“An Aristotelian view need not be
aretaic. Such a view could conceivably be eudaimonistic or a non-eudaimonistic virtue
theory.”) (crediting Larry Solum for this point).
40. See Scott Carson, Eudaimonia, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 10 (Donald
Borchert ed., 2d ed. 2006).
41. Christine Swanton, A Virtue Ethical AcCount of Right Action, 112 ETHICS 32, 38
(2001).
42. Moral virtues are often contrasted with intellectual virtues. See George Bragues,
Seek the Good Life, Not Money: The Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics, 67 J. BUS. ETHICS
341, 345 (2006); Chapin F. Cimino, Virtue and Contract Law, 88 OR. L. REV. 703, 713
(2009) (distinguishing moral/character and intellectual/reasoning traits).  One author
explains:
Virtues are conventionally divided into two categories: intellectual virtues and
moral virtues.  The intellectual virtues perfect our reasoning faculties. Those
intellectual virtues located in the speculative intellect are understanding, sci-
ence, and theoretical wisdom; the intellectual virtues in the practical intellect
are practical wisdom or prudence, and art. The moral virtues perfect our appe-
tites and most prominently include justice, temperance, and fortitude.
Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue’s Home in Originalism, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1997, 2018 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
43. See Richard Kraut, Aristotle’s Ethics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2001), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-eth-
ics/ (“[E]very ethical virtue is a condition intermediate between two other states, one
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much; those who are rash are insufficiently sensitive to danger and
fear too little.  The courageous human is disposed to fear that is
proportionate to the situation.44
The notion of virtue, however, goes beyond mere action:
Virtues do not consist simply of acquired dispositions to engage in
certain external actions.  They are far deeper character traits that,
in addition to manifesting themselves in specific actions, are
bound up with a person’s reasons for taking a particular action as
well as her emotional state as she does so.45
Accordingly, just as “[a] person who does the right thing for the
wrong reasons is not virtuous,”46 good habits alone are not virtues since
they can be mindless.47  Doing good is thus not the same as being virtu-
ous.  On the other hand, merely wanting to do good without effective
execution also is not enough to constitute virtue.  Olivia Bailey points
out that “Aristotelian virtue ethics excludes the person with good inten-
tions but a grossly erroneous understanding of how to realize them
from being virtuous.”48  To sum up, virtue means more than wanting to
do the right thing or doing the right thing, instead “[t]he virtuous
agent . . . does the right thing, undividedly, for the right reason, in the
appropriate way—honestly, courageously, and so on.”49
44. Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV.
475, 497 (2005) [hereinafter Solum, Aretaic Turn]; see also David Luban, How Must a
Lawyer Be? A Response to Woolley and Wendel, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101, 1116 (2010)
(“The traditional understanding of the moral virtues is Aristotle’s assertion that a virtue is
the mean between two extremes—for example, courage is the mean between cowardice
and recklessness.”).
45. Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 864 (2009); see also
Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, (Edward N.
Zalta, ed., 2003), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue.  Hursthouse
writes:
A virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency to do what is honest
or generous, nor is it to be helpfully specified as a “desirable” or “morally valua-
ble” character trait.  It is, indeed a character trait—that is, a disposition which is
well entrenched in its possessor, something that, as we say ‘goes all the way
down’, unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker—but the disposition in ques-
tion, far from being a single track disposition to do honest actions, or even hon-
est actions for certain reasons, is multi-track. It is concerned with many other
actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires,
perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities.  To possess a vir-
tue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset.
46. Peñalver, supra note 45, at 864.
47. See Julia Annas, Virtue Ethics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY
515, 516 (2006).  Good habits can eventually lead to virtue, however. See also Colombo,
supra note 25, at 14 (“[V]irtue has been commonly defined as the ‘habit’ of doing good,
and habits are learned via repeated doing.”) (footnote omitted) (citing Leslie Stephens,
Virtue-Based Ethical Systems, in ETHICAL THEORY, CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 318
(Louis P. Pojman ed., 2d ed. 1995)).
48. Olivia Bailey, What Knowledge Is Necessary for Virtue?, 4 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1, 13
(2010).
49. Annas, supra note 47, at 516. See also Paul Horwitz, Judicial Character (and Does It
Matter), 26 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 149 (2009) (“The virtues are both ‘character traits’ and,
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The second term in virtue ethics that requires further discussion is
the concept of eudaimonia.50  Although eudaimonia can be translated
as “happiness,”51 modern virtue ethicists prefer to translate eudaimonia
as “flourishing,” to avoid the implication that eudaimonia entails sub-
jectively experienced, hedonistic pleasure.52  As Sherman Clark puts it
quite colorfully, happiness in the virtue ethics tradition is “not the satia-
tion of a glutton, or the grinning contentment of an idiot.”53  In con-
trast, modern virtue ethicists posit that eudaimonia is intimately
connected with virtue54 and authentic human flourishing demands
more than the mere satisfaction of individual preferences, or the max-
imization of utility or wealth.55  We will return to the concept of
eudaimonia or flourishing below in the context of mandatory disclo-
sure and objections to virtue inculcation.
B. The Aretaic Turn in Legal Theory: The Emerging Virtue Jurisprudence
The rise of virtue ethics in moral theory has not gone unnoticed in
the legal academy, where scholars have begun to investigate the bene-
fits of applying the teachings of virtue ethics to law and legal institu-
tions, in a burgeoning movement that has been termed “virtue
jurisprudence.”56  Just as virtue ethics offers a third way in the debate
particular ways, but without particularly virtuous reasons for doing so, but actually acting
virtuously and for virtuous reasons.”) (footnotes omitted).
50. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 761–72 (2009) (discussing human flourishing in great
detail).
51. See Carson, supra note 40.
52. See Annas, supra note 47, at 520; Hursthouse, supra note 45 (observing that “vir-
tue ethicists claim that a human life devoted to physical pleasure or the acquisition of
wealth is not eudaimon, but a wasted life”); Carson, supra note 40, at 10 (“In philosophical R
contexts the Greek word ‘eudaimonia’ has traditionally been translated simply as ‘happi-
ness,’ but a number of contemporary scholars and translators have tried to avoid this
rendering on the grounds that it can suggest unhelpful connotations in the mind of the
uncritical reader.”).
53. Sherman J. Clark, Law as Communitarian Virtue Ethics, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 772
(2005).
54. See Hursthouse, supra note 45 (“All standard versions of virtue ethics agree that
living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for eudaimonia.”); Carson, supra note
40, at 10 (“As is well known, Aristotle agreed that virtue is a necessary condition for R
eudaimonia but held that it is not sufficient.”); Louden, supra note 23, at 688 (“Tradition-
ally, moral virtues have been defined as traits that human beings need to live well or
flourish.”); Peñalver, supra note 45, at 864 n.169 (“While the virtues are conducive to
human flourishing, their possession is no guarantee that the virtuous individual will in
fact flourish.”); Statman, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, in STATMAN, supra note 28, at 8 (“Vir-
tues are viewed as necessary conditions for, or as constitutive elements of, human flourish-
ing and well-being.”).
55. See Ronald J. Colombo, Buy, Sell, or Hold? Analyst Fraud from Economic and Natural
Law Perspectives, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 140–41 (2007) (contrasting law and economics
view of efficiency and wealth maximization with natural law notion of eudaimonia or true
human flourishing).
56. The first book devoted to the subject was VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE (Colin Farrelly
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between consequentialists and deontologists in moral theory,57 virtue
jurisprudence provides an alternative in the stalemate between prevail-
ing schools of deontological and consequentialist thought in normative
legal theory.58
The virtue jurisprudence program is still in a relatively early stage
of development, though the literature is growing at a remarkable rate59
with scholars analyzing and evaluating the value of virtue theory in a
range of different substantive areas of law.60  One does not want to
reduce aretaic legal theory to the level of slogans, nevertheless, Colin
Farrelly and Lawrence Solum sum up the virtue jurisprudence move-
ment as follows:
57. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice Pre-Appoint-
ment Experience, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1137, 1183 (2012) (“Virtue ethics are seen as a ‘third way’
around the eternal battle between the consequentialists and the deontologists.”) (citing
Christopher Miles Coope, Modern Virtue Ethics, in VALUE AND VIRTUES: ARISTOTELIANISM IN
CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 37–38 (Timothy Chappell ed., 2006)).
58. The debate is often conceived of as a between rights-based deontological theo-
ries often indebted to Kant and law and economics theories with a grounding in welfare
economics.  For a particularly lucid discussion of this debate, see Lawrence B. Solum, Pub-
lic Legal Reason, 92 VA. L. REV. 1449 (2006); see also Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum,
An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law, in FARRELLY & SOLUM, VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 56, at 3–6.  This state of affairs has led Colin Farrelly and Larry Solum to
conclude that “contemporary normative legal theory, despite its vibrancy and sophistica-
tion, is stuck in certain recurring patterns of irresolvable argument.” Id. at 6.
59. A major contribution to the emerging virtue jurisprudence literature was a
recent special issue of the Cornell Law Review that concerned whether property law ought
to incorporate the teachings of virtue ethics. The lead articles were Gregory S. Alexander,
The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009);
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009).  Responses included
Eric R. Claeys, Response, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
889 (2009); Jedediah Purdy, Response, A Few Questions About the Social-Obligation Norm, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 949 (2009); Henry E. Smith, Response, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation
Between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009); Katrina
M. Wyman, Should Property Scholars Embrace Virtue Ethics? A Skeptical Comment, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 991 (2009).  Alexander’s reply to the responses to his lead article can be found in
Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063 (2009).
60. See Solum, supra note 43, at 494–95 (citing works in many fields of law).  One R
leader of this movement is Larry Solum, who has done important work on virtue ethics,
judging, and constitutional theory. See Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-
Centred Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY, 178 (2003). [hereinafter Solum, Theory of
Judging]; Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to Judicial
Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1988). [hereinafter Solum, Judicial Selection]; Solum,
Aretaic Turn, supra note 43.  Another scholar at the vanguard is Kyron Huigens who has R
been the leading proponent of an explicitly aretaic approach to criminal law. See Darryl
K. Brown, What Virtue Ethics Can Do For Criminal Justice: A Reply to Huigens, 37 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 29, 29 (2002) (noting that Huigens has produced a “series of innovative, trench-
ant articles . . . developing a virtue ethics approach to criminal law”).  Huigens’s works
include Kyron Huigens, On Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 465 (2004); Kyron Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 97 (2002) [hereinafter Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms]; Kyron Huigens, Solving
the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 425 (2002); Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty
Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1237 (2000); Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and
Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943 (2000) [hereinafter Huigens, Dead End of Deterrence];
Kyron Huigens Virtue and Criminal Negligence, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 431 (1998); Kyron
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For virtue jurisprudence, the final end of law is not to maximize
preference satisfaction or to protect some set of rights and privi-
leges: the final end of law is to promote human flourishing—to
enable humans to lead excellent lives . . . the fundamental concepts of
legal philosophy should not be welfare, efficiency, autonomy, or
equality; the fundamental notions of legal theory should be virtue
and excellence.61
Even more directly, Solum states: “Writ large, virtue jurisprudence
is the view that the proper aim of legislation is the promotion of human
flourishing through creation of the conditions for the development of
human excellence—the distinctively human virtues and vices.”62
By now, the reader may have questions about whether virtue ethics
is a suitable alternative to the prevailing deontological or consequen-
tialist schools of moral and ethical theory, and whether, and exactly
how, the concepts of virtue and eudaimonia can fruitfully be incorpo-
rated into legal discourse.  The next section will explore how virtue
jurisprudence might be applied to mandatory disclosure laws, which
may partially answer such questions, though the discussion is also likely
to raise deep concerns regarding the role of virtue in lawmaking.
II. VIRTUE ETHICS AND MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
A. Shifting the Perspective to Virtue and Human Flourishing
Why do we have mandatory disclosure laws?  It may be difficult to
generalize regarding a legal phenomenon that exists in myriad distinc-
tive and different regulatory environments.63  The conventional conse-
quentialist or utilitarian perspective assumes, however, that compelling
firms or individuals to make disclosures will produce good conse-
quences.  From a consequentialist perspective, it would be absurd to
require disclosures (which entail a social cost) unless we believed that
the provision of information will change behavior in some way that we,
as members of society deem beneficial.  The precise nature of the good
consequences depends on the area of law in which the disclosures are
mandated:64 more efficient and fraud-free securities markets (securities
disclosure laws), more efficient and fraud-free consumer credit markets
(truth in lending laws), better-informed and presumably healthier eat-
ing choices (nutritional labels), less smoking (cigarette labels), and so
on.  In each regulatory realm, presumably, regulators have determined
that the mandated disclosures will produce good consequences that
outweigh the costs of these disclosures.65  If such a calculation has not
been done, or it turns out to be incorrect, then the disclosure regime
61. Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum, An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law, in
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 56, at 2–3 (emphasis in original).
62. See Solum, supra note 44, at 478.
63. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. R
64. See Dalley, supra note 4, at 1120 (noting that often “regulatory disclosure
schemes are intended to produce a particular result in a market”) (emphasis in original).
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may fail from a consequentialist perspective.66  In contrast, a deontolog-
ical perspective on mandatory disclosure would ask whether people
have some “right” to certain information or whether a firm has a moral
obligation to provide certain information, irrespective of whether or
not providing this information will actually produce good conse-
quences.  Even more radically, a mandatory disclosure deontologist
might argue that people have the right to certain information even if
providing this information produces bad consequences.67
Virtue jurisprudence compels us to view mandatory disclosure
from a different perspective than the dominant consequentialist van-
tage point.  Recall how Larry Solum, one of the movement’s intellectual
leaders, describes the basic idea of virtue jurisprudence: “Writ large,
virtue jurisprudence is the view that the proper aim of legislation is the
promotion of human flourishing through creation of the conditions for the devel-
opment of human excellence—the distinctively human virtues and vices.”68
In the context of mandatory disclosures, instead of merely asking
whether consumer or individual “rights” to obtain certain information
are being protected (standard deontological concerns) or whether mar-
ket failures are impeding the utilitarian satisfaction of individual con-
sumer preferences (the classic law and economics/consequentialist
perspective), virtue jurisprudence asks us instead to consider the con-
nection between mandated disclosures, the virtues, and eudaimonia or
human flourishing.  More specifically, a virtue ethicist might question
whether mandatory disclosure laws can contribute to human flourish-
ing by fostering certain virtues in consumers or citizens.  To figure out
what those virtues might be, it is helpful here to note two aspects of
human flourishing identified by Gregory Alexander and Eduardo
Peñalver:
First, human beings develop the capacities necessary for a well-
lived, and distinctly human life only in society with, indeed,
dependent upon, other human beings. To put the point even
more directly, living within a particular sort of society, a particular
web of social relationships, is a necessary condition for humans to
develop the distinctively human capacities that allow us to
flourish.
The second characteristic of human flourishing to be stressed is
that human flourishing must include at least the capacity to make
meaningful choices among alternative life horizons, to discern the
66. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 735 (“Whatever benefits mandated R
disclosures may offer, mandates are unjustifiable if their costs outweigh their benefits.”);
Dalley, supra note 4, at 1127 (noting that “the costs of any particular disclosure scheme
may outweigh its benefits”).
67. There may be situations where more information in the marketplace ironically
produces “bad” outcomes because consumers do not respond to the additional informa-
tion as policymakers would have hoped. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics:
Human Errors and Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 131 (2006) (noting, in the
credit card context, that “by putting the government into the fray, there is always the risk
that debiasing will take the form of rebiasing, by overstating credit card risks to individu-
als who would do well to have them”).
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salient differences among them, and to deliberate deeply about
what is valuable within those available alternative choices.  This is
what authentic, robust freedom must involve.69
Accordingly, assuming that the proper social environment exists
for fostering eudaimonia, those virtues that facilitate meaningful deci-
sion-making may facilitate (or embody, depending on our view) human
flourishing.  But which virtues might those be?  The first virtue that
comes to mind is the classic virtue of temperance,70 which is “the virtue
of control over excess.”71  Louke van Wensveen summarizes this virtue
as follows:
Aristotle considered the rule of mind over desire a virtue, called
sôphrosunê, which we usually translate as “temperance” . . . .
Specifically, he argued, temperance preserves practical wisdom
from influence of undue manifestations of desire . . . .  Conse-
quently, the equanimity resulting from temperance contributes to
the cultivation of virtue in general.  Moreover, the moderation of
desire contributes to the attainment of personal flourishing.72
To return to the concept of virtue as a mean,73 Van Hooft explains:
“[T]he central meaning of temperance for Aristotle is that it is the
mean between being too preoccupied with pleasure (licentiousness)
and having too little interest in it (insensibility).  For Aristotle, then, not
being attracted to the pleasurable things in life is just as much an ethi-
cal failure as indulging them to excess.”74
Peterson and Seligman, who approach virtue from the perspective
of positive psychology, subdivide the strength of temperance into four
positive traits: (1) forgiveness and mercy; (2) humility and modesty; (3)
69. Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 THEO-
RETICAL INQ. L. 127, 135 (2009).
70. At times, aspects of this virtue are referred to as frugality. See Antonio
Argandoña, Frugality, 4 (IESE Business School, University of Navarra, Working Paper No.
873, 2010), available at http://www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/DI-0873-E.pdf  (“Frugality, as
a combination of temperance and prudence, demands . . . that all the effects of human
action be taken into account: the effects on the agent and the effects on others (including
the environment, which will affect others now and in the future).”); James A. Nash,
Toward a Revival and Reform of the Subversive Virtue: Frugality, in CONSUMPTION, POPULATION
AND SUSTAINABILITY: PERSPECTIVES FROM SCIENCE AND RELIGION 167, 174 (Audrey R. Chap-
man, et al., eds. 2000) (suggesting that frugality can be “understood as the economic
subspecies of temperance”); Louke van Wensveen, Attunement: An Ecological Spin on the
Virtue of Temperance, 8 PHIL. IN THE CONTEMP. WORLD 67, 68–69 (2001) (discussing con-
nections between temperance and frugality).
71. Peterson & Seligman, supra note 38, at 38.
72. Van Wensveen, supra note 70, at 67 (citing Aristotle’s NICOMACHEAN ETHICS,
II.2, 1104a25, and VI.5, 1140b11–20) (footnote omitted); Sherman Clark, Neoclassical Pub-
lic Virtues: Towards an Aretaic Theory of Law-Making (and Law Teaching) 19, (Michigan Law
School, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 189,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1552413 (“A temperate person  . . . is one
who can enjoy but is not enslaved to pleasure or prestige.”).
73. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. R
74. VAN HOOFT, supra note 28, at 61; see also Bragues, supra note 42, at 346 (“[S]elf- R
control regulates our attraction to pleasure. It is a mean between the licentiousness or
self-indulgence entailed by having too much pleasure, or delighting in the wrong things,
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prudence; and (4) self-regulation.75  The latter two—prudence and
self-regulation—seem to bear some connection to the type of meaning-
ful decision-making noted above by Gregory Alexander and Eduardo
Peñalver.  Self-regulation is “how a person exerts control over his or her
responses so as to pursue goals and live up to standards.”76  More spe-
cifically, self-control,77 “allows people to override responses that hinder
happiness or health and, further, to substitute or develop more adap-
tive responses.”78  We can thus see why, in Peterson and Seligman’s
view, self-control is “a vital psychological strength that is crucial to per-
sonal well-being”79 that “should be amply cultivated and fostered.”80
Although Peterson and Seligman see few drawbacks to possessing self-
control81 they acknowledge that “the emphasis on consumption in
modern American society undermines the value of self-control, despite
the fact that hard work and self-reliance are cornerstones of the Ameri-
can dream.”82  They comment, “During the 20th century, American cul-
ture shifted away from its traditional emphasis on self-denial toward
active promotion of self-indulgence and immediate gratification, stimu-
lated in part by advertising and economic realities, and it is plausible
that such shifts have reduced the overall level of self-control in Ameri-
can culture.”83
Prudence is the other aspect of temperance that bears some con-
nection with frugality.  Despite its modest, modern connotations, in vir-
tue ethics, “prudence” is of immense importance.  Prudence in virtue
theory is synonymous with “practical wisdom” or phronësis,84 which can
be thought of as the intellectual virtue that unites all of the other
virtues:85
The centerpiece of aretaic ethics is thus an exemplary practical
rationality or practical wisdom—in Greek, “phronesis.” Phronesis
is the ability to deliberate on and frame an overall conception of
the good life—that is, the flourishing life—and to integrate one’s
particular choices into this all-encompassing conception. The per-
75. PETERSON & SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 430–44.
76. Id. at 500.
77. Id. (“The term self-control is sometimes used as a synonym for self-regulation, but
other writers use it more narrowly to refer specifically to controlling one’s impulses to
behave in a moral fashion.”) (emphasis in original).
78. Id. at 516.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 508 (observing that self-control could be used “in the service of dastardly
and anti-social aims”).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 513.
84. VAN HOOFT, supra note 28, at 66.
85. Phronêsis can be contrasted with another intellectual virtue, sophia, which is
usually translated as theoretical wisdom. See Stefan Kapsch & Peter Steinberger, The
Impact on Legislative Committees and Legislative Processes of the Use of the Initiative in the Ameri-
can West, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 689, 696 (1998) (“Phronêsis is defined largely in negative
terms; it is not the same as sophia or theoretical wisdom, which is a matter of scientific
knowledge (epistêmê) and insight (nous). Sophia is about immutable facts in the world,
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son possessed of phronesis, the phronimos, is a person of mature
judgment who has the capacity to identify and pursue the good
amid the contingencies of practical human affairs.86
From a positive psychological perspective, Peterson and Seligman
define prudence in a way that should have apparent relevance for
mandatory disclosure laws:
Prudence is a cognitive orientation to the personal future, a form
of practical reasoning and self-management that helps to achieve
the individual’s long-term goals effectively.  Prudent individuals
show a farsighted and deliberative concern for the consequences
of their actions, successfully resist impulses and other choices that
satisfy shorter term goals at the expense of longer ones, have a
flexible and moderate approach to life, and strive for balance
among their goals and ends.87
Prudence may seem a bit like the concept of expected utility theory
in rational choice theory,88 under which individual “decision makers
conduct an explicit or implicit cost-benefit analysis of competing
options and select the optimal method of achieving their goals.”89  For
virtue ethicists, however, the notion of prudence is a morally richer and
thicker concept than expected utility theory.  We can see this point in
this discussion of the virtue ethics decision process:
Confronted with an irreducibly complex moral world populated
by a plurality of values, the wise person is the one who is consist-
ently able to reconcile them and discern the correct course of
action.  But the exercise of wisdom does not involve the arithmetic
application of a simple cost-benefit formula.  Or, as Rosalind Hur-
sthouse puts it, virtue ethics does not aim at generating an
“‘algorithm for life’ independent of judgment.”  Instead, judg-
ment, understood as constitutive of the virtue of practical wisdom,
plays a central, organizing role.90
Prudence in the virtue ethics tradition, therefore, goes well beyond
the notion of identifying and employing the means most likely to help a
person achieve her desired ends, whatever they might be.  In virtue eth-
ics, as opposed to some forms of economic analysis, which treat a per-
son’s preferences as beyond critique,91 a person’s ends and means are
86. Kyron Huigens, Nietzsche and Aretaic Legal Theory, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 563, 573
(2003) (citing Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1455–56
(1995)).
87. PETERSON & SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 478.
88. See Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323,
325-28 (2008) (summarizing rational choice theory); THOMAS S. ULEN, Rational Choice The-
ory in Law and Economics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 790 (Boudewijn
Boukert & Geerit de Geest eds., 2000).
89. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1063 (2000).
90. Peñalver, supra note 45, at 887 (citing HURSTHOUSE, supra note 26, at 54).
91. See Louis E. Wolcher, Senseless Kindness: The Politics of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 25 LAW
& INEQ. 147, 155 (2007) (arguing that Cost-Benefit Analysis “fails to address the question
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both subject to close examination and moral evaluation.92 One scholar
explains: “The prudent individual consistently makes the right decision
to further every facet of a good life for him or herself, making sure to
maintain their heath, finances, social relationships, and, most impor-
tantly of all, their moral virtue.”93  Accordingly, a person is not truly
prudent if he selects means that are well-suited to achieve ends that do
not embody virtue or do not constitute or contribute to human flour-
ishing.94  Chapin Cimino, who asserts that, “phronesis seems to capture
the interrelationship of means and ends,”95 puts the point well:
Virtue refers at once to those features of personhood that allow
for deliberation about right ends and about right means, symbioti-
cally. In virtue theory, means and ends are interrelated both
because acting in a way consistent with moral virtue or character
requires “right reason,” and because the “perfection of reason
depends upon the cultivation of the virtues of character . . . .  [I]n
Aristotelian theory, the moral virtues are not and cannot be disag-
gregated from the intellectual virtues. Both are bound up
together in one complete circle of means and ends.”96
If we accept the basic teachings of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics,97
consumers who possess virtues such as the classic virtue of temperance
and the master virtue of phronesis (practical wisdom) have a greater
chance of achieving eudaimonia or authentic and true human flourish-
ing than consumers who lack such virtues.  In fact, a virtue theorist
might argue that those without temperance and prudence are more
likely to make consumptive choices that interfere with the achievement
of eudaimonia.  Mandatory disclosures, especially in the realm of con-
sumer law, therefore, may facilitate meaningful decision-making by pro-
moting or creating the conditions under which these virtues can be
freely exercised.  The next subsection will provide a brief illustration of
how legally mandated information can be viewed from an aretaic,
rather than consequentialist perspective by looking at the field of con-
sumer credit.
normative system: as an empirical social science, CBA is configured in such a way that it
lacks any mechanism for adjudicating the validity of people’s preferences.”).
92. Cimino, supra note 35, at 285 (“[P]ractical wisdom is the result of experiences
built up over time.  These experiences in combination allow a person to exercise wisdom,
though at the unconscious or intuitive level, which in turn leads to an appropriate judg-
ment about how to respond to a practical dilemma.”).
93. Bragues, supra note 42, at 353. R
94. R.J. Araujo, S.J., Thomas Aquinas: Prudence, Justice, and the Law, 40 LOY. L. REV.
897, 908 (1995) (“[P]rudence directs us to specify that action which we must take in
particular circumstances to do that which is good and avoid that which is evil in every day
life.”).
95. Cimino, supra note 42, at 717.
96. Id. at 714.
97. Despite the explosion of interest in virtue ethics and virtue jurisprudence, it
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B. An Illustration: Consumer Credit Disclosures
Consumer credit has obvious social benefits.  In general, “[f]rom
an economist’s perspective, credit . . . allows consumers to smooth con-
sumption over time, meaning that they borrow from future good times
to help make it through current tough times.”98  Although an efficient
credit market99 can facilitate borrowing that increases consumer wel-
fare, severe information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders
can impede credit market efficiency.  In addition, according to some
scholars “a growing body of psychological evidence suggests that bor-
rowers have behavioral impulses that lead them into making decisions
that are counter to their own best interests.”100  Put simply, some bor-
rowing serves to enhance consumer welfare, while other borrowing may
diminish consumer welfare.  Accordingly, within the consumer credit
market, lawmakers seek regulatory tools that will minimize severe infor-
mation asymmetries and limit suboptimal consumer decision-making,
with the overall goal of maximizing consumer welfare, however this is
measured.101  The basic idea is to protect the welfare-enhancing
properties of credit cards, home loans, and other forms of consumer
credit, while ameliorating the negative effects on individual consumers
and society as a whole that ill-advised consumer borrowing can
cause.102
98. Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of Payday Loans: Misguided?, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1023, 1026 (2012).
99. See Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance,
4 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 168, 170 (2002) (“In a perfectly competitive market the interest
rate will reflect the time value of money, inflation, and the risk of default.”); Jinkook Lee
& Jeanne M. Hogarth, The Price of Money: Consumers’ Understanding of APRs and Contract
Interest Rates, 18 J. of PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 66, 66 (1999) (“In a perfectly efficient
financial market, the price of a loan is a function of its risk.”).
100. Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory Lender”—A Proposal for Candid
Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893, 910 (2012) (collecting
sources, including Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373–76
(2004); Karen E. Francis, Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and Economics Analysis of the
Payday-Loan Industry, 88 TEX. L. REV. 611, 627–31 (2010); Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral
Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725, 725–39 (2005); Debra Pogrund Star &
Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological Analysis of Disclosure Laws and Call for
Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 85, 85–131
(2010); Willis, supra note 15). R
101. See Katherine Porter, The Damage of Debt, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 979, 984
(2012) (suggesting “a multidimensional framework for studying debt that incorporates
study of how debt may affect elements of welfare, such as education, health, work, hous-
ing, and the ability to participate in social life”).
102. For example, many (though by no means all) commentators would place pay-
day loans in the category of harmful credit. See Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or
Villains?, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 28 (2011) (surveying the debate); Michael A. Stegman, Payday
Lending, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 169, 176 (2007).  The debate over payday loans can be
summed up as follows:  “Industry insiders contend that transaction costs are high due to
the short-term, high-risk nature of bridge loans. Consumer advocates argue that payday
lenders prey on those that are so financially illiterate or unsophisticated that they are
willing to take up such expensive loans.” Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information
Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and Payday Borrowing, 66 J. FIN. 1865, 1865–66 (2011).  Payday
loans work as follows: For every $100 borrowed on a payday loan, payday lenders charge
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In the United States, it is fair to say that mandatory disclosure is the
dominant form of regulation when it comes to consumer borrowing.103
There are, of course, special cases where policymakers directly inter-
vene into consumer credit markets or regulate the specific terms of
consumer credit contracts.104  Usury laws are the classic case of such
intervention, and more recently the Federal Credit CARD Act,105
responded to allegedly egregious credit provider practices by limiting
specified interest rate changes and certain credit card fees.106  But the
substantive rules imposed by the Credit CARD Act were a clear change
from the regulatory norm in the field.107  For the most part, regulators
avoid substantive interference into the consumer credit market and
instead choose to regulate through mandatory disclosure.  The ratio-
nale for this regulatory approach is stated by Cass Sunstein: “Tradition-
ally, information production and disclosure have been considered an
appropriate regulatory response to market failures that stem from asym-
metric or inadequate information.  Properly designed disclosure
requirements can significantly improve the operation of markets, lead-
ing consumers to make more informed decisions.”108  In sum, the argu-
on a two-week loan.”  Skiba, supra note 98, at 1027.  Given the astronomical appearance of
these annualized interest rates, it is not surprising that payday loans inspire loathing in
consumer rights advocates, who view them, like many other fringe credit products, as
cases where the benefits of consumer borrowing are far outweighed by the costs. Id.
Despite this negative attention, payday loans remain a multi-billion dollar business in the
U.S. See Bertrand & Morse, supra, at 1865 (repeating news estimates that “[i]n 2007,
Americans paid an estimated $8 billion in financial charges to borrow $50 billion from
payday lenders.”).
103. Dee Pridgen, Putting Some Teeth in TILA: From Disclosure to Substantive Regulation
in the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2010, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
615, 619 (2012) (“Until recently, despite its shortcomings, disclosure remained a pre-
ferred approach to problems in consumer credit, with various attempts being made over
the years to continue to improve the timing, formatting and wording so as to make the
disclosures more useful to consumers.”).
104. Payday loans are an example where consumer advocates often press legislators
to go beyond disclosure regulation. See Skiba, supra note 98, at 1027 (noting that for
payday loans there are many potential regulatory approaches that legislators can take
including “outright bans, interest rate caps, limits on rollovers/renewals, information dis-
closure rules, regulations specific to military personnel, ceilings and floors on loan
amounts, and restrictions on loan duration”).
105. Credit CARD Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–24, 123 Stat. 1734.
106. See Joseph U. Schorer, The Credit CARD Act of 2009: Credit Card Reform and the
Uneasy Case for Disclosure, 127 BANKING L.J. 924 (2010) (surveying substantive and disclo-
sure changes implemented by the Credit CARD Act of 2009).
107. See Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 1002 (2012) (“Traditionally, disclosure mandates were the regu-
latory technique that dominated credit card regulation. The CARD Act stays the course in
this regard, retaining the historical focus on disclosure. But it also moves beyond disclo-
sure, restricting—even banning—certain practices.”) (footnotes omitted); Zachary J.
Luck, Bringing Change to Credit Cards: Did the Credit Card Act Create a New Era of Federal Credit
Card Consumer Protection?, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 205, 205 (2011) (“In the Credit CARD
Act, Congress turned away from more than thirty years of primarily disclosure-only regula-
tion of credit cards.”).
108. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1366
(2011) (footnotes omitted); see also Dalley, supra note 4, at 1108 (asserting that most
forms of disclosure regulation “are intended either to reduce information asymmetries in
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ment is that better disclosures can improve consumer decision-making,
which in turn may produce good consequences overall for consumers
and society.109
Of course, this may not actually be the case.  Mandatory disclosures
can fail for many reasons,110 not the least of which is the dreaded
“information-overload.”111  But whether or not information overload—
whatever the term means112—impairs rational consumer decision-mak-
ing113 or, more generally, whether mandatory disclosure laws are
indeed effective is not my point here—though those are extraordinarily
important issues.  The discussion in this Article merely hopes to demon-
strate that the philosophical underpinning of most mandatory disclo-
sure laws, especially in the consumer credit market, is consequentialist,
and that the vast majority of scholarship in the field explicitly adopts
this consequentialist, market-perfecting approach to analyzing con-
sumer credit regulation and disclosure.114  A quote from an article by
Professor Oren Bar-Gill and (now U.S. Senator) Elizabeth Warren cap-
tures the flavor of this discourse:
109. See Dalley, supra note 4, at 1109 (stating that “requiring the disclosure of infor-
mation can reduce search costs in economic transactions, improve the efficiency of mar-
kets, and provide other social benefits as a consequence of these economic benefits”);
Melissa B. Jacoby, Dodd-Frank, Regulatory Innovation, and the Safety of Consumer Financial
Products, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 99, 102 (2011) (stating that the recently enacted Dodd-
Frank Act, which created the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection “aims to facilitate
a credit marketplace where borrowers can clearly understand the full costs of products
and engage in better comparison shopping”).
110. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 665 (“The great paradox of the R
Disclosure Empire is that even as it grows, so also grows the evidence that mandated
disclosure repeatedly fails to accomplish its ends.”); see also id. at 679 (“Mandated disclo-
sure is not doomed to fail, but it rarely succeeds.”).
111. Roland E. Brandel & Jeremy R. Mandell, Preemption Under The Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Act of 2010, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 307, 309 (2010) (“The growing
wisdom of decades, born of multiple empirical studies, is that information-overload can
be detrimental to consumers and that additional disclosure may provide lesser rather
than greater consumer protection.”); Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory
Lender”—A Proposal for Candid Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893,
916 (2012) (“Research shows that consumers tend to reduce the amount of effort they
expend on making sound decisions when those decisions become more complex—a phe-
nomenon known as information overload.”).
112. The exact meaning of information overload can be less than crystal clear. See
Jeffrey M. Kuhn, Information Overload at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Reframing the
Duty of Disclosure in Patent Law As a Search and Filter Problem, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 90, 112
(2010) (observing that “[t]he concept of ‘information overload’ has been treated by such
various disciplines as organizational science, behavioral economics, consumer research,
and information science” and thus “there is no universally agreed-to definition for the
term”).
113. See Dalley, supra note 4, at 1115–16 (discussing information overload); Amy J.
Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in The Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 279,
309–10 (2012) (“[A]dvertising and disclosure laws generally fail to correct for imperfect
information, especially when disclosures add to the information overload that already
clouds consumers’ abilities and inclinations to read and understand their contracts.”)
(citing Debra Pogrund Star & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological Analy-
sis of Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 85, 86–95, 113–26 (2010)).
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The market for consumer credit is not operating efficiently. Evi-
dence abounds that consumers are sold credit products that are
designed to obscure their risks and to exploit consumer misunder-
standing.  Ordinary market mechanisms, such as competition and
expert advisers, cannot fully correct these deficiencies. Without reg-
ulatory intervention, market distortions and inefficiencies will continue to
grow, imposing substantial costs on American families and on the
economy.115
This quote illustrates the manner in which the discussion, even
from the left side of the political spectrum, proceeds.  Note the high-
lighted terms—the credit market is not operating “efficiently,” and that
there are “distortions and inefficiencies” that impose “costs” on families
and the economy.116  This language of consequentialist, economic dis-
course dominates the debate.  One rarely hears deontological justifica-
tions for mandatory disclosure,117 though the consumers’ “right to
know” is sometimes used rhetorically in an instrumental sense.118
Within this consequentialist, market-perfecting paradigm, one of the
big questions of the day is whether and how behavioral economics can
be used to improve mandatory disclosures.  For example, Oren Bar-Gill
and Ryan Bubb recently proposed new mandatory credit card disclo-
sures that “are designed with the imperfectly rational cardholder in
mind,” that “can also reduce the cost of collecting information for the
perfectly rational cardholder” and will not “stand in the way of efficient
risk-based pricing.”119  This analysis evidently is part of a dialogue
intended for those who have accepted an economic, consequentialist
view of mandatory disclosure law.
Virtue jurisprudence provides legal scholars with a different moral
vocabulary when discussing matters of law and public policy—one that
can be a refreshing alternative to neo-classical economic language,
which tends to focus on efficiency, wealth maximization, and cost-bene-
fit analysis, or neo-Kantian talk about “rights.”120  As noted above, vir-
tue theory tells us that we should not simply take consumers’
preferences as unquestioned exogenous variables, as in neo-classical
115. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 17, at 100 (emphasis added). R
116. Id.
117. As stated above, a deontologist would ask whether consumers have a right to
certain disclosures, regardless of whether the costs of such disclosures would outweigh the
benefits to consumers or even society as a whole.  Put differently, a deontologist would ask
whether values such as truth or autonomy create a moral obligation to provide certain
information to borrowers even if the benefits of disclosure are not outweighed by the
costs.  A purely deontological argument for particular consumer credit disclosures might
strain credulity. Cf. Rubin, supra note 7, at 283–84 (questioning the connection between
“Truth,” with a capital “T” and annual percentage rate disclosure).
118. That is, I might say that you have the right to know the APR so that you can
comparison shop and get a better interest rate, which will make the mortgage market
more efficient and should be better for society.  This is plainly a consequentialist, not
deontological, argument.
119. See Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 107, at 1002.
120. See Clark, supra note 72, at 16 (arguing that “the ways in which lawyers and
legal academics argue about law and policy, conduct our research, represent our clients,
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economics,121 nor should we view consumers simply as victims of myr-
iad forms of pernicious exploitation with bundles of rights that might
be violated.  A virtue ethicist would not merely ask whether the available
sources of credit are properly priced according to the risks posed by
particular borrowers and whether additional or superior disclosures will
eliminate market failures (the classic law and economics consequential-
ist perspective) or whether borrowers have the “right” to certain specific
information regarding the transaction at issue (standard deontological
concerns).  In stark contrast, virtue jurisprudence asks us to consider
whether consumers in various credit markets are truly flourishing and
whether the dominant forms of legal regulation, such as mandatory dis-
closure, are contributing to this authentic human flourishing by pro-
moting virtues such as temperance and prudence (phronesis).  A virtue
ethicist accordingly would ask whether the existing legal regime—with
its fetishistic obsession on detailed disclosures—is retarding or interfer-
ing with consumers’ eudaimonia.  Would different types of disclosures
be more likely to promote consumer virtue?  What might such disclo-
sures look like in the field of consumer credit or elsewhere?  These are
matters that scholars and regulators have not considered.
Even more controversially, a virtue ethicist would ask whether the
borrowing itself and the ultimate consumption for which the borrowing
is intended are likely to contribute to the consumer’s flourishing or
whether the borrower ought to use his financial resources in a different
way altogether.  In short, for a committed virtue ethicist, mandatory dis-
closure might be used as a legislative tool to override ill-conceived con-
sumer preferences that do not embody virtue and are unlikely to
contribute to or constitute authentic human flourishing.  This sug-
gested use of mandatory disclosure might seem quite radical given the
normal discourse on consumer regulation, and the next section
addresses the obvious objections to this potential turn to virtue.
III. THE VALUE PLURALISM OBJECTION TO VIRTUE INCULCATION
A. General Objections to Virtue Inculcation
Even if we agree that virtue ethics is suitable for evaluating or
directing individual decision-making or that certain virtues are norma-
tively desirable, it is not clear whether lawmakers ought to attempt to
foster virtue through legislative means.122  Ekow Yankah is right on
121. See Owen D. Jones, et al., Economics, Behavioral Biology, and Law, 19 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 103, 123 (2011) (“Economists are mostly concerned with the ‘how’ ques-
tions—such as how people are likely to respond to particular costs and benefits—given
assumptions about their preferences.  In other words, and ignoring important exceptions,
economists usually treat preferences as exogenous, and are often loathe to explore either
those preferences or their sources.”).
122. See Claeys, supra note 18, at 946–47 (pointing out that “in virtue ethics and in
political-philosophy scholarship, scholars still regard it as an open and extremely impor-
tant question whether the prescriptions of virtue ethics can be transplanted seamlessly
from the field of ethics back to the field of politics”); Yankah, supra note 39, at 1175 (“The
attractiveness of virtue ethics as a moral theory . . . does not determine the attractiveness
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point when he states: “Virtue theory insists we meet the fundamental
questions of political philosophy squarely. Can the law legitimately seek
to inculcate virtue?”123  Traditional virtue ethicists, such as Aristotle
and Aquinas, answered this question in the affirmative.124  In fact, Rob-
ert George notes that “the belief that law and politics are rightly con-
cerned with the moral well-being of members of political
communities . . . distinguishes the central tradition from its principal
rivals.”125  In short, traditional virtue ethics endorsed the use of law to
shape private morality.
Many modern theorists, however, are skeptical.  The notion that
law can be used effectively as a tool to inculcate virtue can be chal-
lenged on at least three philosophical or psychological grounds.126
The first objection to legal virtue inculcation questions the psychologi-
cal underpinnings of virtue theory: it simply is not clear whether it is
possible to foster “stable dispositions” in human beings.127  This objec-
tion thus is connected to the challenge raised by “situationalism,” to
dispositionism.128  Situationalism “[i]n simple terms . . . is the view that
human behavior is caused by the situations in which humans find them-
selves as opposed to human character traits.”129  The situationist/dis-
positionist divide pervades legal discourse and it cannot be lightly
evaded.130  Obviously, if people do not have stable character traits, it
might be futile to use the law, or any other instrument, to shape their
character.131  The case for virtue jurisprudence is weakened considera-
bly if virtue ethics turns out to be premised on an inaccurate under-
standing of human behavior.  Whether and to what extent people have
stable character traits, whether virtuous or not, is likely to be a persis-
123. Yankah, supra note 39, at 1169.
124. See Colombo, supra note 25, at 25–28 (discussing traditional virtue ethics views
of virtue inculcation through law).
125. See Robert P. George, The Central Tradition—Its Value and Limits, in VIRTUE
JURIS. 24 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008).
126. This article will mostly deal with the third objection, but it is valuable to note
briefly the other two objections since they are likely to be raised any time there are calls
for using law to inculcate virtue.
127. See Katrina M. Wyman, Should Property Scholars Embrace Virtue Ethics? A Skeptical
Comment, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 991, 1000–1002 (2009) (citing, inter alia, KWAME ANTHONY
APPIAH, EXPERIMENTS IN ETHICS (2008)).
128. See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to The
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
129 (2003); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspec-
tive on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004).
129. Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus Character, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 659, 673 n.36  (2005).
130. See Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent
Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 314 (2008) (noting a
“divide . . . based on two attributional approaches: the dispositionist approach, which
explains outcomes and behavior with reference to people’s dispositions (i.e., personali-
ties, preferences, and the like), and the situationist approach, which bases attributions of
causation and responsibility on unseen or unappreciated influences within us and around
us”).
131. On the other hand, a situationist who desires certain public policy ends might
use the law to create the context or situations in which people are more likely to make
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tent question asked of virtue theorists.  A full treatment of this psycho-
logical question is simply beyond my scope and capacity here, though I
do not want to minimize its importance—talk about implementing poli-
cies that affect character can always be met by questions about whether
stable character itself exists.
The second objection to virtue ethics is connected to the role of
choice in moral theory.132  One might ask whether it is truly “moral”
(however that term is defined) for a person to make correct choices
solely because she fears legal sanctions.133  Many moral theorists and
laypeople alike would bristle at this idea of morality.  As Robert George
has stated: “Laws cannot make men moral.  Only men can do that; and
they can do it by freely choosing to do the morally right thing for the
right reason.”134  Nevertheless, George points out that while “[m]oral
goods cannot be realized by direct paternalism,”135  law can reinforce
positive moral teachings136 and prevent “the bad impact of [further]
involvement in the vice on . . .  character.”137  Furthermore, there is the
effect that law can have on what George calls the “moral ecology” or
moral environment:
[L]aw . . . is poorly suited to dealing with the complexities and
details of individual’s moral lives.  Law can forbid the grosser
forms of vice, but certainly cannot prescribe the finer points of
virtue.  Nevertheless, laws that effectively uphold public morality
may contribute significantly to the common good of any commu-
nity by helping to preserve the moral ecology which will help to
shape, for better or worse, the morally self-constituting choices by
which people form their character, and in turn affect the milieu
in which they and others will in future have to make such
choices.138
132. See George, supra note 125, at 29.
133. ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY
44 (1993) (“Someone who refrains from vice merely to avoid being caught and punished
under the law prohibiting the vice realizes no moral good (though he may avoid further
moral harm).”); see also Colombo, supra note 25, at 24 (“[A]lthough law and regulation
can do a good job of compelling people to mimic virtuous behavior, they do a poor job
(according to [Robert] George) of directly making people virtuous.”).
134. GEORGE, supra note 133, at 1; George, supra note 125, at 44 (“Moral goods are
‘reflexive’ in that they are reasons to choose which include choice in their very meaning;
one cannot participate in these goods otherwise than by acts of choice, that is internal acts
of will, and the internal disposition established by such choices.  As internal acts, they are
beyond legal compulsion.”).
135. GEORGE, supra note 133, at 46.
136. George, supra note 125, at 31 (explaining that Aristotle implies that “making
men moral is not for the polis alone: political communities should do what they can to
encourage virtue and prevent vice, while other institutions should do what they can to
complement the work of the polis”); GEORGE, supra note 133, at 46 (“As Aristotle and
Augustine rightly held, a community’s laws will inevitably play an important educative role
in the life of the community.  They can powerfully reinforce, or fail to reinforce, the
teachings of parents and families, teachers and schools, religious leaders and communi-
ties, and other persons and institutions who have the leading roles in the moral formation
of each generation.”).
137. GEORGE, supra note 133, at 46.
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To sum up this second objection to legislating virtue, one might
claim that taking a good or right action solely because the action is
compelled by law should not truly count as moral or ethical behavior.
Even if we accept this premise, though, it does not mean that the law
cannot help to create the conditions or moral ecology in which it will
be more likely that people would make choices for the right reasons.139
To use an example from academia, a student who refrains from cheat-
ing solely because she is afraid of an institutional penalty may not be
considered “moral” or virtuous by some observers when she decides not
to cheat.  On the other hand, this does not mean that an institution’s
rules and regulations regarding academic integrity cannot help to cre-
ate an environment in which it is more likely, in the long run, that
students will act properly for reasons other than a fear of direct
sanctions.140
B. The Value Pluralism Objection
Even if we accept that people do have stable character traits and
that law can help inculcate morality perhaps through shaping the moral
ecology or some other indirect means, we run into the chief objection
to any virtue inculcation project: value pluralism.  The notion that pro-
motion of virtue of any kind is a legitimate goal for lawmakers or legisla-
tion is a controversial proposition in a liberal democratic society
because such a project might be, as Katrina Wyman observes, “in ten-
sion with the idea animating our pluralistic society that individuals have
wide leeway to pursue their own ways of life.”141  To understand
Wyman’s point, we need to return once again to the concept of
eudaimonia, which seems to embody two very different notions:
139. This does not mean that law is enough. See George, supra note 125, at 46 (“Of
course, it is a mistake to suppose that laws by themselves are sufficient to establish and
maintain a healthy moral ecology.  It is equally a mistake to suppose, however, that laws
have nothing to contribute to that goal.”).
140. This may start to sound a bit like some strands of legal expressivism. See Ben
Depoorter & Stephan Tontrup, How Law Frames Moral Intuitions: The Expressive Effect of
Specific Performance, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 673, 714 (2012) (“[L]egal rules can work as anchors,
causing individuals to eventually internalize the preferences embodied in the legal rule.
Individuals comply with legal commands (e.g. do not smoke in public, clean up after your
dog) not merely because of the fear of possible sanctions, but because individuals either
internalize the preferences stated in the law or hold the belief that others have done
so.”); Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as
Antidiscrimination, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 664-66 (2004) (“Expressive law, which is a fur-
ther evolution of the field of law and social norms and behavioral economic scholarship,
explores the question of how law shapes individual preferences by changing one’s taste
for specific outcomes, beyond the traditional effect of sanctions, through altering behav-
ior.  This can be because the new law either carries a symbolic social meaning, or because
it affects the way individuals mediate that symbolic social meaning.  What is crucial to this
analysis is the nexus between law, norms, and social meaning.  When designed appropri-
ately, law can cause individuals to alter their own behavior because either the law induces
them to change their tastes (internalization), creates a fear of bearing social sanctions
(second order sanctions), or because of pressure brought to bear upon them through
societal sanction (third order sanctions).” (citations omitted)).
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“[E]udaimonia” seems in Aristotle’s writings to fill two roles: on
the one hand, it appears to be a rough synonym of “well-being” or
“flourishing,” a notion that concerns what benefits a person; this is
pretty much the conventional understanding of the term.  On the
other hand, it is claimed to represent whatever it is that would
constitute an ideal life, a life that is most choiceworthy, and thus
occupies a role akin to the broad understanding of “good life.”142
Accordingly, there appears to be an aspect of eudaimonia that is
“overtly and explicitly seeking . . . substantive content of norms by
recourse to a transcendental domain—a metaphysical idea about the
‘well-lived life’ or what ‘human flourishing’ might mean.”143 To the
extent that legislation grounded in virtue ethics or virtue jurisprudence
imposes a specific conception of the good life upon us, such theories
can conflict with our liberal commitments to individual autonomy.
One need not be a libertarian to find this troubling:
Even those who have more sympathy with some species of commu-
nitarianism, or “perfectionist” liberals who deny that the law can
or should be wholly neutral between competing conceptions of
the good, may be disturbed by the thought that the law might
make the promotion of virtue, and in consequence the elimina-
tion of vice, part of its aim: we surely should not trust so crude and
potentially oppressive a mechanism as the law to discharge so sen-
sitive a task.144
Taken to an extreme, the idea of legislating virtue may remind
readers of the religious and social controls exercised by the Taliban in
Afghanistan (who actually had a Ministry of Promotion of Virtue and
Prevention of Vice)145 or the religious police in Saudi Arabia, which
polices public morality.146  Frightful examples such as these may be why
Peter Koller contends that attempts to use legal force to form moral
virtues “unavoidably leads, at best, to public hypocrisy, or even more
142. Daniel M. Haybron, Well-Being and Virtue, 2 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1, 20 (2007).
143. Yishai Blank, The Reenchantment of Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 633, 652 (2011).
144. R.A. Duff, The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 214, 215
(2003) (footnote omitted).
145. Thomas Barfield, Culture and Custom In Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan, 60
ME. L. REV. 347, 368 (2008) (footnotes omitted) (citing KAMAL MATINUDDIN, THE TALIBAN
PHENOMENON: AFGHANISTAN 1994–1999 (1999) “[T]he Taliban’s only innovation in gov-
ernment was the creation of a powerful new and Saudi Arab-inspired Ministry of Promo-
tion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.  This ministry was home to the religious police who
forced people to pray, checked that men had long enough beards, and beat women who
violated Taliban rules on dress or movement.  The Taliban’s religious controls extended
to bans on music, dance, films, kite flying, chess playing, card games, and other forms of
popular entertainment.”).
146. In Saudi Arabia, “the religious establishment plays a central role in the coun-
try’s governance and has broad influence over many aspects of everyday life.” HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, PERPETUAL MINORS: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES STEMMING FROM MALE GUARDI-
ANSHIP AND SEX SEGREGATION IN SAUDI ARABIA 11 (2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/reports/saudiarabia0408_1.pdfIn particular, it handles “the policing
of ‘public morality’ through the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Preven-
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likely, a total repression of free thought.”147  Or in slightly less feverish
terms, Eric Claeys states: “When politics is about legislating virtue and
not about securing rights, it tempts sectarian believers to gain political
power to compel subjects to be virtuous as defined by the teachings of
their particular sect.”148
As an abstract matter, the value pluralists have a point when they
object to the imposition of virtue under threat of government sanc-
tions.  Certainly no one wants a melding of politics, law, and virtue that
“encourages factious citizens to use ‘virtue’ as a political and ideological
bludgeon to help their own factions acquire dominancy and to
subordinate rival factions.”149  Such a possibility should give any sensi-
ble scholar or policymaker pause before advocating the legal regulation
of virtue and vice.  Furthermore, many people believe that individual
autonomy entails the right to choose what type of life we want to lead
and the right to define “flourishing” for ourselves.  It makes us squeam-
ish to think that a particular conception of the good life might be
imposed upon us by law.  Like the vigorous debates over the role of
behavioral economics in policymaking, a turn to virtue is likely to run
up against objections based on anti-paternalism.  How do we know
when a consumer is living “the good life?”  Who is going to tell us how
or what to consume?  Are government bureaucrats going to override
our preferences and set standards for consumption?  How thrifty or fru-
gal is thrifty or frugal enough?150  Can consumers be too thrifty or fru-
gal?151  Although these concerns are well-founded, the remainder of
the Article aims to convince the reader that the value pluralism objec-
tion need not be fatal, at least not in the case of regulation through
147. Peter Koller, Law, Morality, and Virtue, in WORKING VIRTUE 191, 199 (Rebecca
L. Walker & Philip J. Ivanhoe eds., 2007).
148. Claeys, supra note 18, at 926.
149. Id. at 922.
150. See Argandoña, supra note 70, at 12 (asserting that “[w]hat constitutes frugal
behavior cannot be determined on the basis of extrinsic criteria such as the absolute
amount of a person’s expenditure, or a person’s expenditure as a percentage of his
income, or one person’s expenditure compared to that of other people in similar or less
privileged circumstance”); David A. Crocker, Consumption and Well-Being, in AUDREY R.
CHAPMAN, ET AL., CONSUMPTION, POPULATION AND SUSTAINABILITY: PERSPECTIVES FROM SCI-
ENCE AND RELIGION 207, 208 (2000) (pointing out that any consumption norm that
presumes to set precise limits would be “arbitrary, even dictatorial” but that “we require
. . . general principles that will allow each of us to make choices appropriate to the distinc-
tive character of our individual circumstances”).
151. This would seem to be the ideal spot to include the stock reference to what
economists term the “paradox of thrift.” See JOHN BLACK, NIGAR HASHIMZADE, & GARETH
MYLES, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 300 (4th ed. 2012) (“The basis of the argument is
that in a depressed economy attempts to save more from present incomes reduce con-
sumption and thus income levels. The fall in incomes then discourages investment, so
that ex post savings and investment actually fall: this is the paradox of thrift.”); Mechele
Dickerson, Vanishing Financial Freedom, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1080, 1118 (2010) (“Reasonable
amounts of household savings are needed to foster economic stability and keep the econ-
omy strong. But saving too much and having too little household debt harms the econ-
omy by reducing the demand for goods and services and—as we are seeing now—by
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mandatory disclosure laws when the objective of such laws is the promo-
tion of virtues such as temperance and prudence.
C. Overcoming the Value Pluralism Objection in the Case of
Mandatory Disclosure
This final subsection aims to show that the value pluralism objec-
tion, as potent as it is, need not be fatal, depending on the type of
virtue that we seek to inculcate and the precise legal method that we
use for this inculcation.  First, let us discuss the types of virtue before us.
Not all virtues are the same.  Some virtues and vices are more controver-
sial than others.  Even those with libertarian leanings acknowledge that
law, in some manner, is a proper tool for the inculcation of certain
morally uncontroversial virtues.  For example, Eric Claeys uses the vir-
tues mentioned in the Virginia Declaration of Rights as examples as
these widely-praised and accepted virtues:152 “Governments may
encourage and inculcate virtues, but only the lowest-hanging fruits on
the virtue tree.  The Declaration covers moderation, temperance, frugality,
but not religious orthodoxy, speculative excellence, the excellences of
farming, business, or the martial life, or other rivalrous individual
virtues.”153
Thus, a distinction can be drawn between the state trying to incul-
cate controversial religious and sexual virtues154 and the types of virtues
that enable citizens to thrive economically—virtues such as moderation,
temperance, and frugality.  Claeys explains:  “By transferring maximal
control over wealth-creating resources to individuals, the liberal com-
monwealth encourages citizens to practice and acquire virtues of indus-
try, self-mastery, and moderation.”155  Regardless of whether we fully
accept Claeys’s perspective about the proper role of government in a
liberal society, it seems hard to dispute that virtues such as temperance
and prudence, which may contribute to individual economic prosperity
or even authentic human flourishing, can be placed in a different cate-
gory than those moral virtues that are primarily connected to religious
or sexual orthodoxy.  Encouraging people to save money for retirement
or to take out a mortgage that fits their financial needs is a bit different
from telling people that they may not read certain types of books or
engage in specified sexual acts in private.
Furthermore, assuming that virtues such as temperance and pru-
dence are inoffensive or appropriate virtues to inculcate, the method of
152. Claeys, supra note 18, at 932 (“[N]o free Government, or the Blessings of Lib-
erty, can be preserved to any People but by a firm Adherence to Justice, Moderation,
Temperance, Frugality, and Virtue, and by frequent Recurrence to fundamental Princi-
ples.”) (citing VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XV (June 12, 1776)).
153. Id. (emphasis added). It is worth noting that several state constitutions also
echo the Virginia Declaration of Rights and mention frugality. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. 1,
art. XXXVIII; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XVIII; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 22.
154. See Koller, supra note 147, at 199 (arguing that “the law must not enforce eccen-
tric moral ideals, such as the prohibition of soft drugs or the prevention of homosexual
relationships”) (emphasis added).
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virtue inculcation is also relevant.  One of the leading proponents of
virtue ethics in law, Kyron Huigens, has made the bold claim that “the
justifying purpose of the criminal law is the inculcation of sound practi-
cal judgment—a quality which is also known as virtue.”156  This Article
has used regulation of consumer finance as a vehicle for exploring the
virtue jurisprudence project.  The idea of using the criminal law to
inculcate temperance and prudence naturally calls to mind sumptuary
laws,157 which have a long and controversial history.158  Such laws were
a prominent feature of the American colonial legal landscape,159 and
even were praised by luminaries such as John Adams (though the
future President acknowledged that they were controversial):
The very mention of sumptuary laws will excite a smile. Whether
our countrymen have wisdom and virtue enough to submit to
them I know not. But the happiness of the people might be
greatly promoted by them, and a revenue saved sufficient to carry
on this war forever. Frugality is a great revenue, besides curing us of
vanities, levities and fopperies which are real antidotes to all great, manly
and warlike virtues.160
It is fairly well-accepted today, however, that laws which enforce a
society’s “sumptuary codes”161  were used as a means of class and social
control:162
Societies have regularly imposed such controls when their gov-
erning classes come to believe that too much of their society’s
156. Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1237 (2000)
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, supra note 60,
at 445 (“[T]he inculcation and maintenance of the capacity for sound practical reasoning
(virtue in its correct, technical sense) is a prominent objective of punishment that can
justify punishment.”) (citations omitted). See supra note 60 for citations to Huigens’ many
valuable, provocative works applying virtue theory to topics in criminal law.
157. Black’s Law Dictionary defines sumptuary law as “[a] statute, ordinance, or
regulation that limits the expenditures that people can make for personal gratification or
ostentatious display,” and “[m]ore broadly, any law whose purpose is to regulate conduct
thought to be immoral, such as prostitution, gambling, or drug abuse.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1574 (9th ed. 2009).
158. For a valuable summary of the history of sumptuary laws, see Lucille M. Ponte,
Echoes of the Sumptuary Impulse: Considering the Threads of Social Identity, Economic Protection-
ism, and Public Morality in the Proposed Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 45, 52–65 (2009).  One of the seminal works on the subject is ALAN HUNT, GOVERNANCE
OF THE CONSUMING PASSIONS: A HISTORY OF SUMPTUARY LAW (1996).
159. See FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM:  THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
OF THE CONSTITUTION 16 (1985) (“In America, every colony exercised the power of pass-
ing sumptuary legislation, though in their extreme forms such laws were uncommon
except in New England and though in all of their forms their applicability varied with the
social status of the individual.”).
160. John Adams, Thoughts on Government, Applicable to the Present State of the American
Colonies, in JOHN ADAMS, REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS: 1775–1783 (Gordon Wood, ed., 2011)
(emphasis added).  Adams’s quote is from April 1776.
161. See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 809, 812 (2010) (“A society’s sumptuary code is its system of consumption practices,
akin to a language . . . by which individuals in the society signal through their consump-
tion their differences from and similarities to others.”) (footnotes omitted).
162. Nash, supra note 70, at 177 (discussing the misuse of frugality as a tool to keep
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wealth is being wasted on conspicuous or decadent forms of con-
sumption or that their society’s system of relative consumption no
longer operates reliably to differentiate and distinguish—if not to
discipline—the various members of the society.  This latter prob-
lem—the breakdown of a society’s consumption-based system of
social distinction—has typically occurred when formerly rare com-
modities or their equivalents suddenly become abundant or when
lower-status social groups gain the economic power to consume
goods that formerly only upper-status social groups consumed.163
It is not surprising therefore that sumptuary laws—especially in
their purest forms as direct limits on consumption164—have few (if
any) defenders today.165  Furthermore, as a more general matter,
aretaic theories of criminal law and punishment, such as those
espoused by Huigens, are quite controversial.  Many of the most force-
ful arguments against virtue jurisprudence focus on the use of criminal
law to punish the lack of moral virtue:166
There is good reason to believe that even sophisticated aretaic the-
ories of law and punishment cannot be squared with a liberal con-
ception of government, particularly with the central place of
autonomy within liberalism.  This may not be fatal to adopting an
aretaic theory; we can, after all, give up on liberalism but irrecon-
cilable tension with our liberal commitments gives good reason to
pause.167
The general objection to aretaic theories of criminal punishment
or specifically our historical distaste with sumptuary laws or other direct
limits on consumption are not fatal to the virtue inculcation project.
Nothing written here (or indeed, anywhere) suggests that consumers
today should be punished or made criminally liable for their lack of
temperance or prudence.  No one is calling for a revival of sumptuary
laws in any form or a new type of debtor’s prison.168  This Article is not
163. Beebe, supra note 161, at 813 (footnotes omitted). R
164. Id. at 812 (“Historically, laws seeking to govern a society’s system of consump-
tion-based distinction have most commonly taken the form of direct controls on con-
sumption . . . .”).
165. See Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83, 122 (2010) (claiming that
there is no place for sumptuary laws that control how people dress in modern Western
society).  Arguably the aims of sumptuary laws are pursued through other legal means,
such as intellectual property regulation. See Beebe, supra note 161.
166. See generally Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character,
Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1019 (2004).
167. Yankah, supra note 39, at 1192; see also Brown, supra note 60, at 49 (concluding
that virtue ethics does not offer “a substantially more helpful method to either to the
public or to government officials with regard to criminal justice administration” than con-
sequentialism or deontology).
168. See Dickerson, supra note 151, at 1090 (discussing brutal conditions imposed
upon debtors who were imprisoned in colonial America, not always in free-standing
debtor’s prisons) (citing BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN IHE AGE
OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 85–90 (2002); Bruce H. Mann, Tales from the Crypt: Prison,
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arguing that consumers who are not sufficiently prudent in personal
financial matters should be punished criminally by the state for their
lack of virtue.  Instead, this Article is merely suggesting that we need to
investigate the potential for using mandatory disclosure laws to influ-
ence character “indirectly, by encouraging or discouraging conduct
that might indirectly cultivate traits of character,”169 or by “encouraging
or facilitating the development of other institutions through which
traits are articulated or developed.”170  Indirect means of virtue inculca-
tion, such as well-designed mandatory disclosure laws, are less likely to
offend our liberal ethos, especially with respect to relatively uncon-
troversial virtues such as temperance and prudence.
Admittedly, if regulators were inclined to operationalize this
aretaic approach in the field of mandatory disclosure, much more work
would need to be done regarding what constitutes eudaimonia in con-
sumer markets.171  If we are going to judge disclosures according to
whether they help to inculcate virtues that lead to eudaimonia, we need
to have a pretty thick understanding of authentic consumer flourishing.
This part of the virtue jurisprudence project is certainly in its embry-
onic stage.  But I believe that Sherman Clark is right that we need not
agree on “precise account of ultimate good” in order to “begin thinking
about how to help ourselves and one another continue seeking it.”172
Regardless of the precise boundaries of human flourishing, there is
likely to be a great deal of overlapping consensus as to what does and
does not constitute eudaimonia or human flourishing when it comes to
consumption,  especially in the case of consumer credit.  This overlap-
ping consensus can allow the virtue inculcation project to move forward
even if there are disagreements at the margins.
CONCLUSION
Mandatory disclosure is one of the dominant forms of legal regula-
tion, especially within the realm of consumer finance.  Legal discourse
over mandatory disclosure is dominated by consequentialist theorizing,
with most regulators and scholars committed to evaluating mandatory
disclosure regimes instrumentally by evaluating the extent to which
such regulation serves well-established public policy objectives such as
169. Clark, supra note 72, at 8.
170. Id. at 9; see also Koller, supra note 147, at 199 (discussing acceptable ways in
which legal order may foster virtues, including positive incentives, such as tax benefits for
charity).
171. Perhaps it has something in common with Mechele Dickerson’s invocation of
the concept of “financial freedom.”
In general, people have financial freedom if they can plan for future spending
decisions, or can make reasonable predictions about their future ability to spend
money or make purchases. A person would lack economic or financial freedom
if he cannot make spending decisions or choices because of monetary limita-
tions or restrictions, or if an external factor or process prevents him from being
able to control his spending decisions.
Dickerson, supra note 151, at 1083.  This is an interesting starting point for defining con-
sumer eudaimonia, though it probably does not go nearly far enough.
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market efficiency.  In contrast to this approach, virtue ethics and its
brethren in legal theory, virtue jurisprudence, proposes an alternative
vantage point.  Virtue jurisprudence suggests that it would be valuable
to consider whether consumers possess virtue, in the philosophical
meaning of the term, and whether mandatory disclosure laws could
help to create the conditions necessary for consumers to achieve
eudaimonia or authentic human flourishing.  This Article has argued
that some forms of temperance and prudence (phronesis) might be
considered virtues for consumers to possess, and that to the extent that
mandatory disclosure laws can encourage such virtues, such regulation
may help to foster human flourishing.  At the very least, the inclusion of
an explicitly aretaic perspective on consumer law and regulation will
enrich the legal scholarship and policymaking discourse in the field by
allowing us to discuss in a deeper and more meaningful way how law
affects both the means and ends of consumer decision-making.
In closing, it is worth reiterating that efforts at legislative virtue
inculcation are likely to be met with assertions that such paternalistic
laws are impermissible in a liberal society such as ours because these
types of regulation violate individual autonomy and the right to define
for ourselves our own conception of the good life.  There is no doubt
that value pluralism is a potent objection to efforts at legislating virtue.
Nevertheless, this Article has argued that objections to virtue inculca-
tion based on value pluralism are unlikely to carry the day in this con-
text, given the indirect method of virtue inculcation discussed in this
Article (mandatory disclosure laws, rather than criminal law) and the
relatively uncontroversial nature of the virtues sought to be inculcated
(temperance and prudence, as opposed to virtues related to religious
and sexual orthodoxy).  That being said, those who truly support liber-
tarian approaches to legal regulation are likely to have concerns about
any efforts to use the legal system to infuse virtue in consumers.173  It
seems unlikely whether such deep-seated libertarian concerns can be
allayed, though that is a question best left for the future.
173. Similar concerns have been raised against regulation inspired by the teachings
of behavioral law and economics. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral
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